

SpaceSec

Workshop on Satellite and Space Systems Security


Co-Chairs

Martin Strohmeier - Armasuisse, Cyber-Defence Campus
Johannes Willbold - Ruhr University Bochum

Numbers



First time workshop
Half-day
27th February



19 Submissions
10 Accepts
3-4 Reviews/Paper



Full Room
~60 In-Person
~15 Virtual

Workshop Proceedings

Important Dates:

- Paper Submission Deadline: ~~10 January 2023 (AoE)~~ 13 January 2023 (AoE, firm)
- Notification of Acceptance: 3 February 2023 (AoE)
- Workshop Date: 27 February 2023, 1.30pm (Pacific Standard Time)
- Camera Ready Submission: 17 March 2023 (AoE)

How did it go?



Traditional Workshop Format
Extended Discussions

Research/WIP/Position Papers



Traditionally Inaccessible
Merge Space & Sec Research
Fuse Different Research
Institutions

Presentation Topics

4+1 topics on the final frontier of security



CDAO



SECURING THE COSMOS

*ON THE FUTURE OF SPACE
SYSTEMS SECURITY
RESEARCH*



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WHAT'S DIFFERENT ABOUT SPACE SECURITY?

SPACESEC23 @ NDSS



Space is *weird*



Tech adapts to domain

Category	Item	Value
Detect	Space Surveillance	100.00
	Space Threat Detection	100.00
	Space Threat Identification	100.00
	Space Threat Assessment	100.00
	Space Threat Mitigation	100.00
	Space Threat Response	100.00
	Space Threat Recovery	100.00
	Space Threat Prevention	100.00
	Space Threat Deterrence	100.00
	Space Threat Avoidance	100.00
Protect	Space Threat Detection	100.00
	Space Threat Identification	100.00
	Space Threat Assessment	100.00
	Space Threat Mitigation	100.00
	Space Threat Response	100.00
	Space Threat Recovery	100.00
	Space Threat Prevention	100.00
	Space Threat Deterrence	100.00
	Space Threat Avoidance	100.00
	Space Threat Prevention	100.00

Adaptations confound security practices



Defenses/Attacks Derive from Adaptations

Session 1: Threat Modelling

EpirbPlotter from COAA - processing live signals

File View Process Options Help

EPRIB TEST detected at : 22-11-1 0:28:34
UIN : CE000104578
Format : 1 (long)
Protocol : 0 (location protocol)
Country :
User code : 7 Serial Location Protocol
Cospas appv : 0 ser.: 130
Location source internal
121.5 MHz homing
Location : N 3° 56' E 1° 08' (+/-4")

EpirbPlotter from COAA - processing live signals


File View Process Options Help

EPRIB TEST detected at : 22-11-1 0:32:31
UIN : C40000A4578
Format : 1 (long)
Protocol : 0 (location protocol)
Country :
User code : 3 ELT - 24-bit Address/Location Protocol
Acft hex id :
Location source internal
121.5 MHz homing
Location : N 3° 56' E 1° 08' (+/-4")

EpirbPlotter from COAA - processing live signals

File View Process Options Help


EPRIB TEST detected at : 22-11-1 0:44:25
UIN : C6000044578
Format : 1 (long)
Protocol : 0 (location protocol)
Country :
User code : 3 ELT - 24-bit Address/Location Protocol
Acft hex id :
Location source internal
121.5 MHz homing
Location : N 3° 56' E 1° 08' (+/-4")



McMurdo AIS EPIRB

Sensors in Space



- Communication systems are a high priority
 - Primary Input, Inherently Sensitive
- But how about other inputs?
- How can sensors be influenced in unexpected ways?



Session 2: Link Segment Security (1)




Eavesdropped Satellite Streams are Corrupted




→ We know the stream is corrupted but we don't know which bytes are corrupted and their correct value

Session 2: Link Segment Security (2)





The Attack

- Override disabling of small-angle satellite broadcasting
- Match known frequency band
- Broadcast noise (additive)
- Accumulate weaker off-angle signals



Session 3: Space Segment Security



Session 4: Test Beds

